



*Historical Perspectives:
Evolution of Recent Mars EDL Systems
Development*

6th International Planetary Probe Workshop

23 - 27 June 2008

Erisa K Hines



Overview



- **An examination of the EDL system engineering organizations that supported the most recent Mars surface missions**
- **Purpose: to understand what effect the organizational structure and team architecture has on the success of EDL system development**



Acknowledgements



Mark Adler

Erik Bailey

Jim Chase

Allen Chen

George Chen

Matthew Golombek

Myron (Rob) Grover

Peter Kahn

Wayne Lee

Rob Manning

Ralph Roncoli

Henry Stone

Sam Thurman


Jason Willis...



Mars EDL History: The Hard Reality



USSR: Mars 2	1971 (crashed)
USSR: Mars 3	1971 (lasted 14 seconds)
USSR: Mars 6	1973 (crashed)
USSR: Mars 7	1974 (missed Mars)
US: Viking 1	1976
US: Viking 2	1976
USSR: Mars '96 (2)	1996 (failed launch)
US: Mars Pathfinder	1997
US: Mars Polar Lander	1999 (crashed)
US: DS-2 Microprobes (2)	1999 (crashed)
Europe: Beagle II	2003 (crashed)
US: MER Spirit	2004
US: MER Opportunity	2004
US: Phoenix	2008





Most Recent Mars EDL History



1997 - Mars Pathfinder & Sojourner Rover (MPF)



1999- Mars Polar Lander (MPL)
(lost)



2004 - Mars Exploration Rovers -
Spirit and Opportunity (MER)



2008 - Phoenix
(PHX)



1996: MPF Overview




- **Lander and short-range rover architecture**
- **Faster, Better, Cheaper**
 - Small cost cap, small team
 - Failure was an option; ref D. Goldin, NASA Administrator at time
- **20 years had passed since last Mars EDL mission: Viking launched in 1976; led by LaRC**
- **Initial concept was fully mechanical EDL system**
 - First “airbag” lander






Generic Project Organization






MPF Phase C





MPF Phase D





MPF Lessons




- **Organizational (“No duhs”? Maybe...)**
 - Team composition closely integrated and expertise-focused; reliance on partners e.g. Ames, Langley
 - Subsystem participation in system-level meetings made compulsory; co-location facilitated
 - Strong team leadership and technical confidence; provides for resource negotiation e.g. airbag testing at Plumbrook
 - Innovative design was followed by innovative testing e.g. airbag landing system
- **MPF Contribution of Firsts**
 - First “end to end” attempt at entry, descent and landing phase simulation; discontinuous but laid ground work
 - Introduction of phase leads for Flight System (Cruise, EDL, etc): authority and responsibility to address operational aspects e.g. commanding, telemetry
 - Basic site-selection architecture / process conceived
- **“The next time we go to Mars...”**
 - Dedicated personnel to Egress (post-EDL) mission phase



1998: MPL Overview



- **Three-legged soft lander architecture**
- **Cost-capped mission**
 - Still Faster, Better, Cheaper
- **Dual-spacecraft program: Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars Polar Lander**
 - Novel approach to relay orbiter-lander pair
- **Lockheed Martin development with JPL oversight and operations**
- **MPL mission lost during EDL; MCO lost during orbit insertion**






MPL Organization




PHASE A, B, C, D



LAUNCH
OPS

PHASE E





MPL Lessons



- **Organizational**
 - Both missions suffered from insufficient (shared) resources; led to lack of personnel
 - Lack of EDL-specific “team” (LMSS) and oversight (JPL) made managing LM work by JPL challenging; no LM/JPL teamwork
 - Phase lead was implemented but lacked knowledgeable “support” team
- **Technological**
 - Complex design required complex testing but lack of resources forced reliance on un-anchored (idealized) simulation
- **“The next time we go to Mars...”**
 - Retain personnel / knowledge continuity as project moves across phases, including operations
 - Managing out-of-house does not mean managing hands-off; an integrated NASA/contractor team allows for best of both worlds
 - Require Mars EDL communications for failure reconstruction



2003: MER Overview



- **Pair of airbag-landed rovers**
- **NASA directed mission**
- **Three year development time (comparatively limited)**
 - “Build to print” of MPF or “Athena in a bag”
 - Growing payload requirement impacts
 - Late additions (DIMES, TIRS...)
 - Flown architecture was “conceptual” heritage
- **Post-MPL risk posture for Mars missions shifted**
 - “Failure is not an option”






MER Organization



MER ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
3/15/07





MER Lessons



- **Organizational**
 - Larger team but still very integrated; subsystems very much a part of the EDL system design (ownership); co-location
 - Late-breaking design changes due to growing payload mass were managed due to resource availability and organization strength
 - Ability to respond to alarming weather reports (change in atmospheric density profile on Mars) in flight credited to successful ops transition and seamless coupling with knowledge centers / partners e.g. ARC, LaRC, LMA
 - With dedicated EDL personnel in a chaotic environment, some flight system interfaces tended to get overlooked or ignored
- **“The next time we go...”**
 - Require EDL-specific milestone reviews to manage system maturity, risks
 - Ensure that the EDL team is addressing FS interfaces regularly
 - Hold a LOT of reserve



2008: PHX Overview



- **Three-legged soft lander architecture**
- **Scout class mission made possible by using Mars '01 flight hardware**
- **Contracted (proposed and won) to LMSS, program management by JPL**
- **Additional risk reduction funds were allocated by NASA HQ to address residual MPL-heritage failure modes**






PHX Organization




PHASE A, B



PHASE C



PHASE D





PHX Lessons



- **Organizational**

- Initial organization was a modified MPL = non-EDL centric organization; minimal JPL interaction
- LMSS proprietary concerns e.g. radar model made JPL mgmt difficult
- Eventual LMSS - JPL team co-location, integration led to strong teamwork and proficient problem solving
- Promoted trust, open communication, simulation collaboration

- **Technological**

- Physical and political constraints due to heritage of MPL and Mars '01 made posed challenges but also provided the impetus for additional needed resources
- Technology differences between Viking and PHX meant less heritage than perceived

- **Forward Recommendations**

- TBD...




Summary




- **Synthesizing / integrating EDL team members in the “virtual” organization (in- and out-of-house missions) provides for strong collaboration and communication = problem solving**
- **Appropriate team composition is critical to adequately addressing challenges**
- **Encouraging system-level thinking by sub-segment engineers can elicit creative system performance solutions**
- **Appointing phase leads provides ownership and authority necessary to transition from development to operations**
- **EDL-specific milestone reviews provide venue to address and manage EDL-specific risks and challenges**
- **“Test as you fly” for Mars EDL is not realizable; therefore, testing successfully requires a team that can develop a creative V&V plan and leadership strong enough to make it happen**



The EDL Organization, Long Term




1997 - Mars Pathfinder & Sojourner Rover




1999- Mars Polar Lander (MPL)
(lost)



2004 - Mars Exploration Rovers - Spirit and Opportunity



2008 - Phoenix



A new experiment in progress (MSL)